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1 Abstract— Contemporary power systems are facing 
increasing intricate conditions that have never been considered 
when initially designing the infrastructure, such as malicious 
threats, accommodating smart grids, etc. As a consequence, 
blackouts albeit seldom but stubbornly keep appearing from 
time to time the world around, and demonstrate their 
devastating capability to create vast damage on both power 
systems and the society at large. 
Patterns of the blackout starting from the first triggering 
events to the system final status have emerged. A framework of 
a coding system was proposed in this paper in order to capture 
the common feature in the system evolution during the 
development of cascades. Cascades in a blackout can be 
tracked by a chain of events with the help of the codes. It is 
facile to adopt the framework to build up a knowledge base of 
blackouts.  
By applying the proposed framework to 31 selected historic 
blackouts, most frequent events, effects and origins are 
identified; the findings can provide useful information for grid 
designers and security experts for ranking the most imminent 
issues in their study. 
 
Index Terms — Decision support systems, Pattern analysis, 
Network coding, Power system security, Risk analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Power outage, also known as power cut, power failure, 
and blackout, is an impelling loss of the electric power 
supply to a large number of population over a wide 
geographical area for certain time. It is inevitably 
accompanied, especially in contemporary world, by huge 
economic costs and social impacts. Reference [1,2] 
discussed the socio-economic impact along with the impacts 
on the power system itself and on the society as a whole. 
Although, the resilience of system plan and operation makes 
blackouts comparatively rare in history, most power systems 
are only designed to sustain one or occasionally two 
independent equipment failures without cascading major 
outages to the customers. 
Since the cost of blackouts are huge, non-stopping efforts 
have always been made to decrease the vulnerability of 
different layers of power systems, such as the physical layer, 
cyber layer, decision making layer, etc., so as to prevent 
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economic and societal damage or at least to further reduce 
its possibility. However, all of these measures are costly. 
Therefore, there is need for panoramic understanding of how 
and where to allocate limited budgets for the preparedness 
of the system against potential failures or ceasing the 
development of the cascades in at a restrained level.    
Many publications and technical reports have been made 
to analyze major power outages that had happened over time 
[3-16]. In those references, one can find detailed 
descriptions of the evolution of system failures and 
mechanisms leading to the blackout in study. The analyses 
of the individual blackout performed by those publications 
were very specific to the power outage in question; therefore, 
it is difficult to have a panoramic view on the most common 
chain of events that could lead to a major system failure.  
  Furthermore, research works from academia [17], 
industrial [18,19], and relative governmental agents [20, 21] 
consented that the tendency of blackouts would increase in 
the future due to many factors, such as intentional attacks 
(malicious threats), deteriorating global climate changes 
(natural threats), and lack of investment in the aging 
infrastructure (accidental threats and systematic threats), etc 
[17].     
 Therefore, the understanding of the common cascading 
mechanisms from triggering events to the final phenomena 
eventually causing blackouts is the most imperative step to 
prevent large scale blackouts, especially when the 
contemporary power systems are operated under extremely 
stressful conditions than ever before.    
This paper tries to provide an overview of the chain of 
events than occur in the network after the materialization of 
a threat which created the triggering events leading to the 
final blackout by reviewing some important major historic 
power cuts. We introduced a new manner to describe the 
major outages around the world by employing a code system 
to form the chain. We analyzed 34 independent events 
among the most important 133 blackouts [17], which 
happened in the developed countries before 2000 and all 
over the world afterwards. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 
the taxonomy used in the paper and the coding system are 
introduced. Section 3 presents the classification of threats, 
events, effects and phenomena used in the analysis of 
development of blackouts and their corresponding codes. 
Section 4 makes the statistic analysis by the framework set 
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up in section 3. Section 5 provides some conclusive 
remarks. 
II. TAXONOMY 
To avoid ambiguity the terms used in the paper are 
defined here. The definitions of the terms listed here only 
reflect what the paper refers to, not their replacement in 
some standards.   
Threats: a source of danger indicating an imminent harm 
to power system. Threats in general can be classified into 
the following four categories [17, 22]:  
- Natural threats: natural disasters not strictly controlled 
by humans which if occurring may impact the power 
system operation by causing damages (geomagnetic 
storms, earthquakes, forest fires, tsunamis, 
hurricane, flood, lightening, hail, animals, etc.);  
- Accidental threats: failure of network devices and 
unintentional human decisional errors that may 
threaten the secure operation of the power system 
(operational fault, system equipment failure, 
accident due to the poor management, etc.);  
- Malicious threats: intentional actions against power 
systems facilities and operation which are 
undertaken by different agents (terrorists, criminal 
groups, cyber attackers, copper theft, vandalism, 
psychotic attack, malware writer, etc.) and various 
means (explosives, high power rifles, malware, etc.) 
with the willingness to cause damage for political or 
economic benefits.  
- Emerging threats: the threat emerged with the evolution 
of power system such as the integration of 
renewable energy and the interdependency between 
power system and other infrastructures. 
Events: topological changes of the physical system, loss 
of components function and variation of operation states 
because of an incident are defined as an event.  
Effects: As the results of an event, power system’ state in 
terms of electrical qualities will vary and get to a new state. 
This state shifting is defined as an effect.  
Phenomenon: the main reason which directly or indirectly 
results in power supply failure and loss of load. 
Failure: the state or condition of the power system in 
which a designed or intended objective cannot be met, 
including system blackout, power outage, transmission 
congestion, communicating media loss, etc. 
Outage: a short or long term loss of the electric power to 
an area. It is a general item and the scale of an outage could 
be of any size. 
Blackout: an accidental loss of electric power which 
would cause large economic losses and affect a large 
number of population and wide geographical area. It is the 
most severe situation of power outage. 
Pre-condition: System operational conditions before the 
materialization of the origin of a blackout, including weather 
conditions, generation and load levels, significant scheduled 
outages, abnormalities and malfunctions of system 
components, including software. 
Origin: the incident affecting one or more power system 
components which trigger a cascading failure. It is also used 
to indicate the first failure in the chain of events. 
Chain of events: a sequence of undesired performance of 
system components, including malfunction, failure, damage, 
etc., which gives birth to and propagates the failure with 
respect to the ability to fulfil the purpose of the system. 
Transient stability: the system’s ability to maintain steady 
following a large disturbance [23] (system failure, loss of 
generation, or circuit contingences). As the disturbance here 
is lager, nonlinear differential equations must be used to 
describe the transient behaviors of some nonlinear dynamic 
components [24]. This is totally different from dynamic 
stability in which linear differential equations are used to 
describe the behaviors of all dynamic components. 
Static stability: the system’s ability to maintain steady 
following a small disturbance [23]. When modeling this 
problem the transient process of electromagnetic circuit 
should be neglected; the mechanical power is considered as 
constant, and the static characteristic of load is considered, 
thus the network can be represented by a set of algebraic 
equations. 
Dynamic stability: system’s ability to maintain steady 
following a small disturbance [23]. But the model of this 
problem is quite different from static stability. The dynamic 
characteristics of generator regulator and other components 
in the power system must be considered [25]. To describe 
this problem, both differential equations and algebraic 
equations should be used. 
III.  FRAMEWORK OF THE CODING SYSTEM  
In order to focus on the evolution of each blackout and 
represent it in such a way that the cascading chain can be 
tracked by a sequence of codes, we set up a framework of a 
coding system containing detailed items and their 
corresponding codes to analyze the mechanism of blackouts. 
The framework could help us capture some patterns in the 
blackouts development. 
One should notice the codes represented here are 
conceptual and based on the analysis of 31 different 
blackouts, selected according to their importance, impact 
magnitude, closeness to the contemporary power systems’ 
situation and availability of technical reports. Therefore, it 
should be updated if items listed in Table I cannot reflect the 
specific feature of a blackout in study.  
Each blackout, no matter where and when it happened, 
can be conceptually and distinctively divided into four parts: 
pre-condition, origin, chain of events and the end condition. 
In each of the four parts, several inferior categories can be 
determined as clusters of similar kinds. 
Table I lists four groups of threats, events, effects and 
phenomena, in which the highlighted characters are 
employed to serve the purpose of coding the incident chain. 
It is expected to reproduce any major failure in power 
systems.  
Example: A solar storm causes an overload in a 
transformer which then trips off the transformer, which then 
creates low voltage in the local area. Thus, using the code 
listed in the table, it can be represented as: 
T-N-SPA-SOL/F-CUR-OVE/E-TRF-TR/F-VOL-LO  
where the '/' signifies the word 'cause' or 'create', while '-' is 
used to represent the depth of an item in the table.  
Example: the first term from above example "T-N-SPA-
SOL" is the track of items that could be found in TABLE I 
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"SOL" (Solar flares) in "SPA" (SPAce) subset of "N" (Natural threats) group under "T" (Threats) column.  
 
TABLE I. CLASSIFICATION OF THREATS, EVENTS AND EFFECTS IN POWER SYSTEMS 
THREATS EVENTS EFFECTS PHENOMENON 
N
at
ur
al
 th
re
at
s  
GEOlogical 
disasters 
AVAlanches GENeration 
Part 
GENerator TRip VOLtage OVer voltage Voltage Collapse 
EARthquakes 
VOLcanic 
eruptions 
GENerator BReak LOw voltage 
LANdslides 
HYDrological 
disasters 
FLOods BACkup 
generator 
FAilure   voltage 
COllapse LIMnic eruptions 
TSUnamis TURbine MAlfunction Static voltage 
Stability METeorological 
disasters 
BLIzzards 
ICE/hoar storm 
COLd wave 
CYClonic storms transmission 
part [TRS] 
transmission 
LINe 
TRip Dynamic 
voltage 
Stability DROughts ISLanding 
HAIlstorms transmission 
LINe 
SHort circuit Transient 
voltage 
Stability 
HEAt waves 
TORnadoes transmission 
LINe 
BReak CURrent OVer current 
LIGhtning 
THUnder power TOWer COllapse ANGle Low frequency 
Oscillation RAInstorm 
FIRes WILd fires INSulators INsulation 
failure 
Subsynchronou
s  Oscillation* 
HEAlth 
disasters 
EPIdemics BUSbar MAlfunction Stability Loss 
SHort circuit 
FAMines transformation 
part [TRF] 
TRAnsformer TRip Static angle 
Stability SPAce 
disasters 
IMPact events 
SOLar flares TRAnsformer BReak Dynamic angle 
Stability GAMma ray 
burst 
SWItch MAlfunction 
SHort circuit 
  VOLtage control/ 
power FACtor 
correction/ 
power FLOw 
control device 
MAlfunction Transient angle 
Stability 
A
cc
id
en
ta
l t
hr
ea
ts
 
OPErational 
faults 
DESign error lightning 
ARRester 
MAlfunction 
WROng decision circuit BREaker MAlfunction FREquency OVer 
frequency MAIntenance 
accident 
CURrent 
transformer  
MAlfunction 
EQUipments 
failures 
TEChnical failure control 
and 
protective RElay 
MALfunction LOw 
frequency 
ANImal 
interference 
DEFective 
maintenance or 
maintenance error 
FIRe threats fire and 
EXPlosion 
DIStribution 
Part 
distribution LINe TRip 
NUClear threat NUClear disasters 
HUMan threat OUTsider threats 
SOCial threats 
CONtamination CHEmical and 
biochemical 
contamination 
SOLar flares/ 
solar winds / 
magnetic storms 
distribution LINe SHort circuit Static 
frequency 
Stability 
M
al
ic
io
us
 th
re
at
s  
PHYsical 
threats 
TERrorist 
attack 
distribution LINe BReak 
WAR act underground 
CABle 
MAlfunction Dynamic 
frequency 
Stability SABotage POle BReak 
HUMan 
threats 
INSider threats FUSe MAlfunction Transient 
frequency 
Stability CYBer 
threats 
MALware INFormation , 
communication 
and control 
systems 
cyber 
EQUipment 
BReak 
terrorists 
HACking 
cyber SYStem HAck 
MAlfunction 
BReak 
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IV. CHAIN OF EVENTS ANALYSIS 
In this section, we performed the statistical analysis on 
the chain of events using the code framework designed in 
the previous section to determine the sequence of events for 
some most typical blackouts, as shown in TABLE II. Table 
II contains the general information of blackouts in terms of 
their time and locations, threat types, triggering events and a 
part of chain of events of the evolution of the blackout, 
whereas Table III includes the rest of chain of events and the 
final phenomenon. It should be noted that the terms shown 
in parallel in the same cell signify the simultaneous 
occurrence of those incidents. Obviously, it is easy to 
quickly grasp how a specific blackout developed by reading 
the codes from TABLE II. Take the Brazilian blackout of 
November 2009 for example. The blackout was initiated by 
a rain storm as a natural threat ([T-N-MET-RAI]). The 
disturbance was reported to almost simultaneously start by 
some single phase short circuits in lines and a single phase 
short circuit on a busbar ([E-TRS-LIN-SH] and [E-TRS-
BUS-SH]) [1]. As it is shown in TABLE II, these triggering 
events caused over current ([F-CUR-OV]) leading to the 
disconnection of some lines and tripping of some generator 
units (E-TRS-LIN-TR], [E-GEN-GEN-TR]). As a 
consequence of the over current conditions which triggered 
lines protection systems, there were some islanding 
synchronic with line disconnection event ([E-TRS-ISL]). 
Consequently, frequency increased up to 63.5 Hz in one 
island ([F-FRE-OV]) and decreased to 58.3 Hz in another 
one ([F-FRE-LO]). There were also overload and power 
swing as the effects of the later mentioned events ([F-CUR-
OV], [F-ANG-SS]). All these disconnections caused a 
voltage collapse eventually, which is shown by [P-VC] as 
the phenomenon in Table III. 
The new code system proposed in TABLE I enables the 
description and classification of the types of events or 
effects and the origins of blackouts. Based on the coding 
system, statistical results are illustrated in the following 
figures in order to capture the most common pattern of the 
evolution of blackouts. Generally, there were 17 types of 
events and 17 different kinds of effects based on the 
classification (TABLE I) in the studied cases. In the 
statistical analysis provided in this section, we mainly 
focused on the following three items: 1) frequency of 
appropriate events 2) the frequency of the appropriate 
effects and 3) the frequency of the origins of the blackouts. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error! Reference source not found., provides the 
frequency of events based on the selected blackouts. For 
example [E-TRS-LIN-SH] which is the code for short 
circuit in transmission line as an event was found in 7 
historic blackouts. Although the same event, like trip off a 
line, may happen in one blackout several times, which it 
would be better to count as several individual events; 
however as these details are not available for all the 
blackouts we selected; therefore, we only considered the 
same event one time in a specific blackout. It should be 
hence noted that the actual frequency of the most frequent 
events would be even higher than it is demonstrated here. 
For example, a transmission line trip is the most frequent 
event. According to our historic data analysis, a 
transmission line trip happened in 81% of the cases. The 
event of transmission line trip ([E-TRS-LIN-TR]) occurred 
25 times shown in Figure 1 were observed in 80.64% of all 
the blackouts studied. In some cases like New York 
blackout in 1977 or Italy power outage experience in 1994, 
this event was observed in the chain of events report several 
times while in some blackouts such as Brazil blackout in 
2002, there was only one reported in the cascading failure. 
In the both above mentioned cases, the event of transmission 
line trip was counted as one event. The counted events could 
be either as the origin of a blackout or a link in the chain 
during the power outage evolution.  
As discussed in the previous section, each event leads to 
an effect or different effects depending on the context 
situation. But the frequency of each effect may rely on the 
vulnerabilities concerned. In Figure 2 the different historic 
blackouts which included the mentioned effect are 
illustrated as a bar chart. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is manifest from Figure 2 that low voltage was the most 
frequent effect in the evolution of all the selected blackouts, 
which was found in 19 cases among 31 studied cases. This 
signifies that low voltage has a 73% probability to happen at 
least once in each blackout. However, it should be noted that 
any kinds of effects might happen several times in each 
study case. According to the statistics, we can conclude that 
low voltage, over current and low frequency are the most 
typical and the most frequent effects which happened at 
least in half of the historic blackouts.  
0 5 10 15 20  25 
Figure 1. Occurrence of appropriate events in selected blackouts 
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Figure 2. Occurrence of appropriate effects in selected blackouts 
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TABLE II. MOST TYPICAL CHAIN OF EVENTS 
Location Date Threat Chain of events 
Brazil 10/11/2009 [T–N–MET–RAI] [E-TRS-LIN-SH] [E-TRS-BUS-SH] [F-CUR-OV] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[E-TRS-ISL] 
Tennessee 
(USA) 22/08/1987 [T–N–MET–HEA] [E-TRF-SWI-SH] [F-VOL-LO] 
Western 
USA 10/8/1996 [T–N–MET–HEA] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
Western 
USA 2/7/1996 [T–N–MET–HEA] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-ANG-DS] 
[F-VOL-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] 
Poland  26/06/2006 [T–N–MET–HEA] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] 
New York 13/07/1977 [T–N–MET–LIG] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-CUR-OV] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRS-REL-MAL] 
[F-CUR-
OV] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-
CUR-
OV] [E-TRF-TRA-TR] 
Canada 5/1/1998 [T–N–MET–ICE] [E-TRS-LIN-BR]  [E-TRS-TOW-CO]  
France 26/12/1999 [T–N–MET–THU] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-VOL-SS] [F-FRE-SS] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-VOL-SS] 
Canada, 
Quebec 18/04/1988 [T–N–MET–TEC] [E-TRS -INS-IN] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Italy  24/08/1994 [T–N–FIR–WIL] Multiple [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
England 28/08/2003 [T–A–OPE–DES] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
Brazil 21/01/2002 [T–A–OPE–DES] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Malaysia 13/01/2005 [T–A–OPE–DES] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-ANG-SS] 
USA-Canada 14/08/2003 [T–A–OPE _ WRO] [E-TRS-LIN-SH] [E-G-GEN-TR] [F-CUR-OV] [F-VOL-LO [E-INF-EQUI-BR] 
Northeast 19/09/1965 [T–A–OPE _ WRO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-CUR-OV] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-CUR-OV] [F-ANG-SS] 
France 12/1/1987 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-GEN-GEN- TR] [F-VOL-LO] 
Tennessee 
(USA)  22/08/1987 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRF-SWI-SH]  [F-VOL-LO] 
Italy 24/08/1984 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Canada, 
Quebec  18/04/1988 [T–A–EQU–TEC] 
[E-TRS-INS-IN] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-SH] 
Southern 
Sweden 23/09/2003 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO ] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-VOL-CO] 
[E-TRS-BUS-MAL] 
Italy 28/09/2003 [T–A–EQU–TEC] 
[E-TRS-LIN-SH] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRF-TRA-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[E-TRS-LIN-SH] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
Australia  13/08/2004 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] 
Western 
Norway 13/02/2004 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRF-VOL-MAL] [F-VOL-OV] 
Greece 12/7/2004 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] 
Australia 14/03/2005 [T–A–EQU–TEC]                                 [E-TRS-LIN-SH] [E-TRS-LIN-BR] 
Pakistan 24/09/2006 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRF-TRA-TR] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
UCTE 4/11/2006 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-CUR-OV ] [F-CUR-OV] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
Spain 23/07/2007 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-BUS-MA] [E-TRS-BUS-MA] [E-TRF-BRE-MA] 
Florida 26/02/2008 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-LIN-SH] [F-CUR-OC] [F-VOL-TS] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [E-TRF-REL-MA] 
UK 27/05/2008 [T–A–EQU–TEC] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Vancouver 14/07/2008 [T–A–FIR–EXP] [E-TRF-TRA-TR] [E-GEN-GEN-BR] [F-VOL-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
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TABLE II. MOST TYPICAL CHAIN OF EVENTS (CONTINUATION) 
Location Date Chain of events Phenomena 
Brazil 10/11/2009 
 [F-FRE-OV]  
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[F-ANG-SS] 
[P-VC] 
Tennessee 
(USA) 22/08/1987 
Multiple [E-TRF-REL-TR] 
Multiple [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Multiple [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] [P-VC] 
Western 
USA 10/8/1996 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-ANG-SO] 
[F-FRE-LO] [P-VC]  
Western 
USA 2/7/1996 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-ANG-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[F-ANG-DS] 
[P-VC] 
[P-SL] 
Poland  26/06/2006 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] [P-VC] 
New York 13/07/1977 [E-TRF-TRA-TR] [F-CUR-OV] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-VOL-SS] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-FRE-SS] 
[F-ANG-SS] [P-SL] 
Canada 5/1/1998 [E-TRS-INS-BR] [P-VC] 
France 26/12/1999 [F-FRE-SS]  [F-CUR-OV] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-VOL-CO] 
[P-SL] 
[P-VC] 
Canada, 
Quebec 18/04/1988 [F-FRE-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR]    [P-VC] 
Italy  24/08/1994 [F-CUR-OV] [F-FRE-LO ] [P-SL] 
England 28/08/2003 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-FRE-CO] 
[F-VLO-LO] 
[P-VC] 
Brazil 21/01/2002 [F-VOL-DS] [F-FRE-DS] [P-SL] 
Malaysia 13/01/2005 [E-TRS-ISL] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-FRE-OV] 
[P-VC] 
USA-Canada 14/08/2003 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
F-CUR-OV 
F-VOL-LO 
[E-DIS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-VOL-TS] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-VOL-TS] 
[F-ANG-TS] [P-SL] 
Northeast 19/09/1965 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-CUR-OV] [F-ANG-TS] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-ANG-TS] 
[F-FRE-TS]  
France 12/1/1987 [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] [P-VC] 
Tennessee 
(USA)  22/08/1987 
[E-TRF-REL-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV]    [P-VC] 
Italy 24/08/1984 [F-CUR-OV] [F-FRE-LO] 
[P-SL] 
Canada, 
Quebec  18/04/1988 [F-FRE-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
Southern 
Sweden 23/09/2003 
[E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-ANG-LO] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-FRE-LO ] 
[F-VOL-CO] 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR] [F-VOL-CO] [P-VC] 
Italy 28/09/2003 [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
[F-VOL-LO] 
[F-CUR-OV] 
[P-SL] 
[P-VC] 
[F-FRE-LO] [E-TRS-LIN-TR] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-FRE-OV] 
[F-VOL-OV] 
[F-VOL-CO] 
Australia  13/08/2004 [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-FRE-LO]  
Western 
Norway 13/02/2004 [E- TRS-LIN-TR ] 
[F-CUR-OV ] 
[F-VOL-OV] 
[F-VOL-CO] 
[P-VC] 
Greece 12/7/2004 [F-VOL-LO] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-VOL-LO] [P-VC] 
Australia 14/03/2005 [F-CUR-OV] [P-SL] 
Pakistan 24/09/2006 [F-CUR-OV] [P-VC] 
UCTE 4/11/2006 
[E-TRS-LIN-TR ] [F-CUR-OV] 
[P-SL] [F-VOL-CO] 
[E-GEN-GEN-TR] [F-FRE-LO] 
Spain 23/07/2007 [E-TRS-LIN-TR]  
Florida 26/02/2008 [F-VOL-LO] [F-ANG-L-O] [E-GEN-GEN-TR] 
[F-FRE-LO] 
[F-FRE-OV] 
[F-FRE-TS] 
 
UK 27/05/2008 [F-FRE-LO]  
Vancouver 14/07/2008 [F-VOL-CO]  
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Due to the same reason of counting each effect as we 
counted events, it should be noted that the real frequency of 
the 3 most frequent events would be actually higher than it 
is depicted here. 
One of the most important concerns in terms of power 
systems vulnerabilities is illustrated in Figure 3. This figure 
shows the origins (triggering events) for all the blackouts we 
studied. When the initiating threat materialized, it started to 
generate a chain of events. Thus it is important to pay a 
special attention to the origin of the chain as it is triggering a 
phenomenon such as voltage collapse or stability loss which 
definitely creates the blackout. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the statistics, generator and transmission 
line trips ([E-GEN-GEN-TR] and [E-TRS-LIN-TR] 
respectively) are the most frequent origins (triggering 
events) that give birth to the whole blackout. As it is 
illustrated in Figure 3, both of the two events initiated 14 
blackouts. It is manifest that these two events are more 
probable and important to the network planning and 
operation, compared with the rest of the events (more than 
three times in terms of their occurrence). In almost 90% of 
the studied cases, these two events triggered the cascading 
failures, which imply remarkable remedies to cease blackout 
if we can prevent such events happen at the very beginning.   
According to the chain of events data in TABLE II, 
technical failure of equipments as accidental threats ([T-A-
EQU-TEC]) was responsible for 50% of generator trip 
events as the origin of the cascades, and 40% of 
transmission line trip events which started the evolution of 
blackouts in studies. 
 For the most import threat, half of the studied blackouts 
happened due to technical failures, among which 33% 
caused generator trips and 33% incurred transmission line 
trips.  
For the most crucial effect, 43% of the generator trips as 
the triggering events caused low voltage and 36% of 
transmission line trips as triggering events caused over 
current as the direct consequences, respectively, which are 
the most frequent physical effects in the studied blackouts 
evolutions as shown in Figure 2. 
Besides the previously mentioned 2 most frequent effects, 
low system frequency can also be observed with the same 
occurrence as over current. From TABLE II, we can achieve 
that 48% of low voltages are caused by generator trips, 86% 
of over currents are due to transmission line trips, and 71% 
of under frequency happened due to generator and 
transmission line trips with more or less the same 
frequencies.  
From the analysis of chain of events in the historic 
blackouts, it is obvious that the most important elements in 
the power system to enhance are the generators and 
transmission lines since no matter what threats happened to 
the power systems, that pieces of equipment would be the 
most vulnerable ones. In terms of the chain of events, the 
trip of generators and transmission lines are also the most 
frequent ones in the development of blackouts. It suggests 
that both the local protection scheme and equipment and 
global special protection schemes for generator and 
transmission lines need to be designed with special care. 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the past decades, power system blackouts have 
become more frequent than ever before. This increasing 
vulnerability is owed to exposure to various threats which 
generates a sequence of events in power systems that lead to 
a blackout [26]. Therefore, to have a better understanding of 
the common patterns on how an exterior factor could 
penetrate into power systems and create huge impacts on the 
society and economy, it is essential to set up a framework 
that allows us to quickly grasp the development of cascades 
in terms of chain of events that occurred in blackouts. 
According to the analysis of the most typical sequence of 
events, it was determined that transmission line trips and 
generator trips are the most frequent events. The most 
frequent effect caused by different events is the low local 
voltage. Over current and low frequency are the next most 
frequent effects. The conclusion could help both grid 
designers and protection system engineers to rank the most 
imminent matters they are faced with. In addition, it could 
also be beneficial for security experts to rank the most 
severe threats to power systems by linking the threats and 
their origins and increase the levels of security for electricity 
infrastructures. 
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